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Abstract: This paper presents a simple repeated-game model of interaction
between an optimizing government and the private sector. Two polar cases are
considered: (a) the private sector is represented by a single agent; and (b) there
is a continuum of heterogenous atomistic private agents. In both cases, the gov-
ernment starts each repetition by making a non-binding announcement about
its future actions. The players have complete and perfect information, with one
exception: the private agents do not know whether or not the government will
act as announced. Thus, each private agent i either behaves with probability πi
as if it trusted the announcement, or plays with probability 1− πi as a Stackel-
berg leader. After observing the reaction of the private sector, the government
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implements the actual policy measures. Finally, the private agent(s) update πi
as a function of the payoffs received.
We show that, although the government’s announcements are never re-
spected, acting as if they were true leads to an outcome that simultaneously
improves the situation of the government and of those players that trust it,
compared to the standard equilibrium solutions. An overwhelming majority of
private agents very rapidly learns to behave as if the announcements were true.
The other agents also experience higher payoffs due to an herding effect. The
fact that the announcements are always reneged is crucial for the solution to be
pareto-improving. These results are in stark contrast to the conclusions usually
presented in the related economic literature.
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inconsistency, reinforcement learning, reversed Stackelberg games, optimal cheat-
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1 Introduction
One of the most ubiquitous and stable characteristics of real-life policy-making
appears to be that decision-makers repeatedly make announcements and promises
that they later do not respect. Based on previous experience, private agents are
fully aware that the promises they hear are unlikely to be kept. Yet, govern-
mental announcements are not neutral. They have an impact on the private
agents’ decisions.
One may wonder why announcements that are suspected from the onset
not to be respected are not totally disregarded. In this paper, we analyze a
situation where these announcements are taken into account because, although
it is known that they will be violated, (a) they contain useful information that
may allow the agents increase their welfare; and (b) not acting as if they were
true may prove to be costly. Thus, the announcements may help as a device
to coordinate on a superior outcome that would not otherwise result from the
interplay between government and private sector. Clearly, there are many other
mechanisms that might explain the real impact of deceitful announcements.
These additional or alternative explanations will not be reviewed here.
The potential usefulness of deliberately using misleading announcements to
pareto-improve upon standard equilibrium solutions was suggested for general
linear-quadratic dynamic games in Vallée and Deissenberg (1998) and subse-
quent papers by the same authors. We demonstrate it here in the context of
a repeated game version of the archetypal Kydland and Prescott (1977) model
— a model that is famed in the economic literature for having popularized a
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diametrically opposed point of view, namely, that the inability of a government
to commit itself to its announcements necessarily implies a very poor economic
outcome.
The paper is organized as follows. We first present the version of the
Kydland-Prescott model used in this paper and the main conclusions usually
drawn thereof in the related literature. Based on perceived ambiguities in the
standard analysis, we then reinterpret the underlying static game between the
government and the private sector, and present the concepts of optimal and
pareto-improving cheating strategies, that are central to the further analysis.
In the next section, the static game is used to define a repeated game between
a government that makes optimally false announcements, and a single private
agent that learns whether or not to disregard these announcements. In a further
section, the model is extended to the case of heterogenous private agents. In the
single as in the heterogenous agent cases, simulations are used to gain insights
on the game’s properties and emerging outcomes. The last section concludes.
2 The Analytical Background
2.1 The Kydland-Prescott one-period model
Numerous variants of the basic Kydland-Prescott model have been proposed,
that do not crucially modify its basic message. This paper uses the Stokey
(1989), (1990) formulation, as presented in the recent work by Sargent (1999),
to which we refer at later places.
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In the Stokey-Sargent formulation, the Kydland-Prescott model is as follows.
A government, L, is engaged in a one-shot game with a continuum of private
agents. There is perfect information. The player’s objective functions and
constraints are common knowledge. The government attempts to maximize
through its choice of y its payoff function:
JL = −1
2
¡
U2 + y2
¢
, (1)
where U is the unemployment rate and y the inflation rate.
Each private agent F i tries to maximize through its choice of xi the payoff
function:
JFi = −1
2
h
(y − xi)2 + y2
i
, (2)
where xi is the agent’s expectation about y. Assuming that all private agents
make the same choice, the average expectation, x, is equal to xi. The game
between the government L and the private agents reduces then to a two-players
game between L and the aggregate private sector F , whereby the private sector
uses x as instrument and has the payoff function:
JF = −1
2
h
(y − x)2 + y2
i
. (3)
The unemployment is supposed to depend upon inflation through an expec-
tations augmented Phillips curve:
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U = U∗ − θ (y − x) , (4)
where U∗ > 0 is the natural rate of unemployment, and θ > 0 is a parameter.
This last equation asserts that unemployment U deviates from its natural rate
only when the private sector anticipates incorrectly the inflation rate, x 6= y.
Taking into account (4), JL can be rewritten as:
JL = −1
2
h
(U∗ − θ (y − x))2 + y2
i
. (5)
The optimal reaction functions TL : x→ y and TF : y → x of L and F are
given by:
TL , argmax
y
JL =
θ
1 + θ2U
∗ +
θ2
1 + θ2 x, (6)
TF , argmax
x
JF = y. (7)
The reaction function TF implies that the private sector can — and will — always
make a perfect prediction of whatever inflation rate the government chooses.
This very strong property is usually interpreted as reflecting the private sector’s
ability to make rational expectations about the governments actions. As noted
at a later point, it is a direct consequence of the very specific definition of the
private sector’s payoff function (3).
Two solution concepts have been traditionally studied in the context of the
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Kydland-Prescott model, namely, the Nash equilibrium (N) and the Stackelberg
equilibrium with L as a leader (SL).
The Nash equilibrium N is given when each player chooses a best response
to the action of his opponent and, thus, has the nice property of being self-
enforcing. It is given by:
xN = yN = θU∗, (8)
JL,N , JL
¡
yN , xN
¢
= −
¡
1 + θ2
¢
U∗2, JF,N , JF
¡
yN , xN
¢
= −1
2
θ2U∗2.
The Stackelberg equilibrium with L as a leader SL, or Ramsey equilibrium,
describes the outcome of a hierarchical situation where L chooses its action y
knowing that F will react to this choice with its best response TF (y). Using
from now on the notation introduced in (8), this equilibrium is given by:
xSL = ySL = 0, JL,SL = −1
2
U∗2, JF,SL = 0. (9)
Clearly, this equilibrium strictly pareto-dominates the Nash equilibrium: both
players are better off under Ramsey than under Nash. Assume, however, that
the government had initially played Ramsey, and that the private sectors ac-
cordingly expects x = xSL = 0. The best answer of the government to x = 0 is
y = θU∗/
¡
1 + θ2
¢
. That is, the government has ex post an incentive to deviate
from Ramsey2. If the government does deviate, the private sector will revise its
2This ”time inconsistency” of the solution is generic for Stackelberg equilibria. It reflects
the fact that, contrary to a Nash equilibrium, a Stackelberg equilibrium does not correspond
to a fixed point in the space of strategies.
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expectations, leading to a new best answer by the government, and so on. It
is easy matter to show that this iterative process converges towards the Nash
equilibrium.
2.2 A few motivating remarks
The existence of ex post incentives to deviate from the Ramsey equilibrium led
to the well-known pessimistic conclusion that, in the absence of binding com-
mitments that force it to play Ramsey, a government would tend to renege on its
previous engagements and act in a way that leads to the inferior Nash solution.
An important and influential trend of research used this finding as a justifi-
cation for advocating strict restrictions on government discretion in economic
policy-making.
The story, however, is less clear-cut than above presentation may have led to
believe. In particular, note that in the course of the presentation we departed
from the original static, one-shot game description of the problem to argument
within a dynamic framework. However, in a dynamic game, the curse of being
forced to coordinate on the unfavorable Nash equilibrium is by no means in-
evitable, see e.g. McCallum (1997). In particular, the Ramsey outcome can be
supported by the need for the government to maintain a favorable reputation,
see e.g. Backus and Driffill (1985). Similarly, it can be supported if the private
sector has the ability to punish the government whenever the latter deviates,
see among others Rogoff (1987), Stokey (1989). The time inconsistency prob-
lem can also be mitigated by incentive contracts or by delegation, Personn and
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Tabelinni (1993), Rogoff (1985), for example. More fundamentally, in a dynamic
framework, almost any outcome can be supported as an equilibrium. This in-
cludes many outcomes that pareto-dominate both the Nash and the Ramsey
equilibria.
Furthermore, note that it is not conceptually straightforward to interpret y
as an actual economic policy decision if one defines x as an expectation on this
decision. Consider for example the game sequence supporting the Ramsey out-
come: L plays first by choosing y; F , that knows y, plays second by making an
expectation x on y. The expectation is made after the action is realized, clearly
a rather contrived scenario. This last observation (and more elaborate versions
of it) led diverse authors to argue very early that the original Kydland-Prescott
problem is not well-defined, see among others Basar (1989), Hall and Henry
(1989), Miller and Salmon (1982). To avoid possible logical contradictions, it is
necessary to make a clear differentiation between the announcement of a policy
measure, ya, and the measure actually implemented, y.
As a final remark, notice that both with the Ramsey and the Nash solutions,
the private sector makes perfect anticipations, x = y. This is not accidental,
but captures the assumption that economic agents are sufficiently rational and
knowledgeable to always correctly anticipate the future if there is no exogenous
uncertainty. Moreover, the Ramsey solution coincides with the unconstrained
optimum of F . The equality x = y, however, is not robust with regard to slight
modifications of the model. Among others, it is no longer given in the Stackel-
berg game with F as a non-atomistic leader. That is, the assumption of perfect
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prediction is not compatible with the natural sequence of play where anticipa-
tions on a variable are made on the basis of the currently available information
prior to the realization of this variable. Furthermore, the equality x = y is not
satisfied either at the Nash nor at the Stackelberg game with F as a leader if
one modifies even slightly the players’ objectives — as can be e.g. seen by assign-
ing to F the (more) plausible payoff function JF = −12
h
(y − x)2 + y2 + U2
i
.
Such a modification also destroys the coincidence between the Ramsey solution
and the unconstrained optimum of F . On the other hand, removing the term y2
from the original payoff-function JF has no impact on the game outcome. Thus,
one may argue that Kydland-Prescott’s private sector does not care about the
real economic outcome: its only preoccupation is with not being fooled upon,
a strong and not innocuous assumption. By contrast, our private agents will
be exclusively or at least primarily interested with the real consequences of the
game.
One can wonder why, in a repeated game, fully rational and perfectly in-
formed agents like L and F in the Kydland-Prescott model would coordinate on
N rather than on some of those superior outcomes. In this paper, we will show
that even less ideally rational agents can easily coordinate on superior solutions
in a set-up that appears both natural and robust.
We now present the framework used in the remainder of the paper for an-
alyzing the interplay between the government and the private sector. Unless
otherwise specified, all assumptions underlying the Kydland-Prescott model pre-
sented in the previous section are valid for the modified model. Notice, however,
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that in most of the Kydland-Prescott related literature it is the private sector
that attempts to control a government which on its own would generate a poor
macroeconomic outcome. In this paper, it is the government that influences the
private in order to improve the economic situation. We shall argue that this is
indeed the raison d’être of economic governance.
3 The single-shot game
Assume the following sequence of play in the single-shot game between L and
F :
1. The government announces that it will chose some inflation rate ya. The
announcement is cheap talk, in the sense that it is not binding and does
not enter as argument the payoff functions JL and JF .
2. After hearing this announcement, the private sector forms an anticipation
x on the inflation rate y that will be effectively implemented.
3. Given this anticipation, the government chooses y.
In this so-called reversed Stackelberg game, L has not one, but two instru-
ments at his disposition, ya and y. The outcome of the game will depend on
the way in which ya influences F 0s anticipation x.We single out two important
benchmarks:
• F fully disregards the announcement, dx/dya = 0. In that case, the
announcement has no impact at all, neither on the actions nor on the pay-
11
offs. Thus, the natural outcome of the single-shot game is the Stackelberg
equilibrium with F as a leader (SF ) 3 :
xSF =
θ
¡
1− θ2
¢
U∗
1 + θ4 , y
SF =
θU∗
1 + θ4 , J
L,SF = −
¡
1 + θ2
¢
U∗2
2 (1 + θ4)2
, JF,SF = − θ
2U∗2
2 + 2θ4 .
(10)
• F believes (or: acts as if it believed) that L will realize y as announced,
that is, that y = ya holds. In that case, x = TF (ya). The best L can
do in the context of a single-shot game is to maximize, with respect to
ya and y, (5) with x replaced by TF (ya) . The resulting optimal cheating
solution (OC) is given by:
ya,OC = xOC = −U
∗
θ , y
OC = 0, JL,OC = 0, JF,OC = −U
∗2
2θ . (11)
The OC solution was introduced by Hämäläinen (1981). It was derived and
analyzed in the case of linear-quadratic dynamic games in Vallée, Deissenberg,
and Basar (1999), Vallée and Deissenberg (1998), and other papers by the same
authors. The term ”cheating” refers to the fact that under this solution gener-
ically one has y 6= ya, that is, the announcement will not be respected.
3This definition of SF assumes that the private agents acts as a single, non-atomistic agent
and accordingly recognize the impact of their aggregate choice on the government’s behav-
ior. Without prejudice for the main message of this paper, one could make the more usual
assumption of private agents that suppose that their choices do not affect the government’s
decisions. In that case, SF coincides with N . If anything, by eliminating an externality from
the argumentation, the alternative retained insures more powerful conclusions.
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The optimal cheating solution OC is extremely attractive for L: there is
no feasible pair (x, y) under which L fares better than under OC. However,
OC is not a reasonable candidate for the coordination in a repeated interaction
between L and F , since playing xSF guarantees F the payoff JF,SF > JF,OC .
Natural choices are strategies where both L and F have higher payoffs than
under SF 4 . We are going to show that there are other cheating strategies with
this property. Before characterizing these pareto-improving cheating strategies,
however, a look in the geometry of the one-shot game may be useful.
N
TL
TF
SF
SL
ya
A
B
y
xx(y
a)
o o
*
*
Ω
Figure 1: The geometry of the Kydland-Prescott model, θ = 1.
In Figure 1, fat lines refer to L and thin ones to F. The straight lines represent
4Since y is now always realized after x is chosen, SL plays no longer any role in the
argumentation.
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the optimal reaction functions, the curved lines indifference curves (that is,
level curves of their respective payoff function). The maximum possible payoffs
of the two players are represented by large dots — moving away from these dots
in any direction decreases payoffs. The Nash equilibrium N lies at the
intersection of the reaction functions. The Stackelberg equilibrium SL (SF ) is
situated at the tangency point of TF (TL) with an indifference curve of F (L).
That is, the Stackelberg solution allows the leader (L or F ) to attain his best
point on the reaction curve of his opponent. By contrast, the optimal cheating
solution OC allows L to attain his best point on his own reaction function —
that is for the class of problems we are considering here, his unconstrained
optimum. The cheating mechanism allowing this outcome is apparent on the
figure. An announcement ya by L incites F to reply with x = TF (ya) — see
point A on F ’s reaction curve. Given x, L replies with y = TL (x) — see point
B on L’s own reaction curve. Since L’s reaction curve goes by construction
through L’s unconstrained maximum, L can insure that the final outcome B
coincides with this maximum trough a proper choice of ya.
Now, neither one of the two equilibria N and SF is pareto-efficient. Indeed,
there exists feasible points (x, y) that are both (a) efficient; and (b) pareto-
improving in the sense that they pareto-dominate SF . Those are the points
situated on that part Γ of the contract curve that lies within the convex lens
Ω delimited by L’s and F ’s indifference curves through SF. Any point within
Γ is a candidate for the outcome of coordination over time. To characterize Γ,
define:
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Jα , αJL (x, y) + (1− α) JF (x, y) , x = TF (ya) , (12)
and consider the set O given by:
O ,
½
(ya,α, xα, yα) : (ya,α, yα) , argmax
ya,y
Jα,α ∈ [0, 1] , xα , TF (ya,α)
¾
.
(13)
That is, O is the set of the optimal cheating solutions OCα that would be
generated if L based its decisions not on its original payoff function JL, but on
a convex combination Jα of JL and of its opponent’s payoff function JF . As α
decreases, this injects an increasing dose of altruism in L0s actions. For α = 1,
OCα coincides with the optimal cheating solution (11). For α = 0, it coincides
with the unconstrained optimum for F , that is here, with the origin. Since in
the model considered TF (ya) = ya, the set O can also be defined by:
O ,
½
(xα, yα) : (xα, yα) , argmax
x,y
Jα,α ∈ [0, 1]
¾
. (14)
In other words, O is the part of the contract curve located between the OC
solution and the unconstrained maximum for F. A somewhat more involved
argument can be used to show that this last result does not depend upon the
fact that TF (ya) = ya, but remains valid for arbitrary payoff functions JF and
JL as long as they are strictly concave in the (scalar) actions.
It is straightforward to prove that:
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There exists a non-empty interval [α1,α2] ⊂ [0, 1] such that (xα, yα) pareto-
dominates
¡
xSL, ySL
¢
iff α ∈ [α1,α2], with strict dominance whenever α1 <
α < α2.
The set Γ of pareto-efficient and -improving cheating solutions is defined by
Γ , {(ya,α, xα, yα) ,α ∈ [α1,α2]} . As one would expect intuitively, α1 is the
unique value of α for which L is indifferent between playing SL or OCα, that
is for which JL,α , JL (xα, yα) = JL,SL. Similarly, α2 is the unique value of α
for which F is indifferent between SL and OCα. The values of α1 and α2 do
not depend upon U∗ and are given by:
α1 = max
"
0,
1 + θ4 −
√
1 + θ2
1 + θ4 + (θ2 − 1)
√
1 + θ2
#
, α2 =
1
1− θ2 +
√
1 + θ4
(15)
Notice that actual cheating is crucial in reaching a pareto-improving out-
come. The outcome SFα obtained by imposing that the announcement be
respected (that is, by imposing ya,α = ya) is the best point on TF for the fic-
titious player JL,α. Clearly, for α < 1, F has a higher payoff under SFα than
under SF. But SFα does not pareto-dominate SF for α 6= 0. Thus, L has no
incentive to respect any benevolent (α < 1) announcement, or to make such an
announcement knowing that it will have to respect it. On the other hand, an
incentive do exist if there is the possibility of subsequent cheating. Moreover,
the private sector also have an incentive to act as if it believed the announce-
ment, even if it knows that it will be cheated upon — as long as the cheating
leads to a point in Γ.
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4 The repeated game with a single agent
From the perspective of a single play of the game, the OCα solutions suffer
from not being equilibria. Once F has played xα in response to an announce-
ment ya,α, L can fare better by playing TL(xα) than TL,α(xα), where TL,α is
the optimal reaction function associated with JL,α. Playing TL(xα), however,
leads to a very bad outcome for F . Being gullible is very costly. Moreover,
in a repeated perspective, the OCα solutions are associated with an apparent
irrationality of the private sector: F repeatedly believes, or acts as if it believed,
the announcement, although it is regularly cheated upon.
We shall argue that this does not necessarily disqualify the OCα solutions
as potential outcomes. For the ease of argumentation, we first consider the
benchmark case of a single private agent F that knows exactly the objective
functions JL and JF and the structure of the economy defined by the Phillips-
curve (4). In particular, F knows xFS and JF,SF . However, F is not sure of the
relationship between the announced and the realized inflation, ya and y.Will L
indeed chose ya = y? Or, at least, will the realized y be such that it is rational
for F to choose x = TF (ya)? In other words, the only incertitude lies in the
fact that F does not know for sure the type of government it is facing.
4.1 The behavior of the private sector
Notice that, after observing an announcement ya, F has fundamentally two
alternatives, denoted OCA (for: Optimal Cheating Accommodate) and PAL
(for: Play as A Leader):
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1. OCA : It can believe (or act as if it believed) the announcement, and thus
choose x = xOCA = TF (ya) .
2. PAL : It can choose any other value of x. In particular, it can choose his
best action in the one-shot game, xFS. We assume in the following that
this is the case.
The PAL alternative so defined essentially mimics dynamics that leads to
the inferior Nash equilibrium in Sargent (1999). Other answers of F are clearly
possible. At a later place, we will give some additional arguments to justify the
fact that we are not considering them in this paper.
Consider now the following repeated game. At each repetition:
1. L chooses an α ∈ [0, 1] and announces ya,α;
2. F plays OCA with probability π ∈ (0, 1), and PAL with probability 1−π.
3. L observes the action x of F. (i) If x = xα, L plays yα. (ii) If not, it plays
its best answer TL(x).
4. F revises its probability of playing OCA or PAL at the next repetition
according to whether or not its realized payoff is higher or lower than JSF .
Notice that, under the very simplifying full information assumption made
in this paper, the payoffs under 3. (i) will depend uniquely of the value of α
chosen by L. The payoffs under 3. (ii) are always equal to JL,SF and JF,SF .
Specifically, we assume that π is updated according to:
πt+1 = φ (πt, ρt, δt) , t = 0, 1, 2, ..., π−2 = π−1 given, (16)
18
ρt ,
µ
max
τ<t
JFτ
¶
− JFt (17)
whith JFt the payoff realized by F at the t-th repetition, and whith δt = 1
if OCA is selected at repetition t, and δt = 0 otherwise. The function φ is
supposed to satisfy:
i. φ (π, 0, ·) = π;
ii. φ (π, ρ, 1) <>π ⇔ ρ
>
<0 and φ (π, ρ, 0)
>
<π ⇔ ρ
>
<0;
iii. φ : (0, 1)→ (0, 1).
Equation (16) defines a so-called reinforcement rule, see e.g. Fudenberg and
Levine (1998), Börgers and Sarin (1997), Brenner (1999) for a discussion of
reinforcement learning in the context of repeated games. Roughly speaking,
this rule implies that a positive experience with OCA (PAL) at the current
repetition increases (and that a negative experience decreases) the probability
with which F will play OCA (PAL) in later repetitions. Here, making a positive
experience means: obtaining a higher payoff at the current repetition than ever
in the past. Thus, the private agent’s changes in behavior depend exclusively
on the economic outcome, that is, on the values taken by U and y. In contrast
to the original Kydland-Prescott model and to most of the related literature,
cheating, that is the occurrence of a discrepancy between ya and y, does not
affect the payoffs — see our corresponding remarks towards the end of Section 2.
Of course, we do not exclude that cheating causes per se real or psychological
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costs to the private agents. This can easily be taken into account by introducing
a corresponding cost term in F ’s payoff function. As long that this cost term is
not overwhelming compared to the other real payoffs, the results we are going
to present remain qualitatively valid.
The assumptions i. and ii. on φ are self explanatory: favorable outcomes
lead the private sector to increase its confidence in the government, wether or not
the latter actually cheats (and similarly for unfavorable or neutral outcomes).
The assumption iii. ensures that L will never get locked into playing exclusively
one of the two alternatives OCA or PAL. The assumption is crucial, since it
is necessary to insure that the private sector always (a) can be incited to move
away from SF to a better equilibrium; and (b) cannot be lastingly lured into an
unfavorable solution. In that sense, giving the government credit for favorable
outcomes but never fully trusting it is a very strong element of rationality.
In the forthcoming simulations, we give the reinforcement rule the specific
form:
πt+1 − πt =



−πt ρt1+|ρt| if ρt ≥ 0
− (1− πt) ρt1+|ρt| if ρt < 0
t = 1, 2, ..., (18)
if OCA is played, and, if PAL is chosen:
πt+1 − πt =



(1− πt) ρt1+|ρt| if ρt ≥ 0
πt ρt1+|ρt| if ρt < 0
t = 1, 2, ... (19)
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This completes the description of F ’s behavior as an agent with (a) perfect
information on all elements of the problem save on the actual choice of y, (b)
perfect memory, but (c) simple, reinforcement-based adaptative behavior. The
assumptions (a) and (b) can easily be weakened to imperfect information and
limited memory.
4.2 The behavior of the government
In contrast to F , the government is supposed to be a maximizing agent. Specif-
ically, we assume that L maximizes at any repetition t, through its choice of
αt, αt+1, ..., αt+h, its expected cumulated payoff over a revolving horizon t+h,
h ≥ 0 a constant:
t+hX
τ=t
E
£
JLτ
¤
−→ max
{ατ}
(20)
subject to (16) .
For h = 0, that is, in the case of a myopic government, the problem is trivial.
The perfectly myopic government is exclusively interested in maximizing its
payoff in the current repetition. Since the payoff under PAL is a constant, and
since the probability that F plays OCA does not depend on L’s choice of α, L’s
best choice is the value of α that maximizes the OCA payoff, that is, α = 1.
A myopic government is not benevolent. As a consequence, π decreases each
time it is updated. On the long run, the private sector tends to systematically
disregard the government’s announcements.
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For h = 1, L’s problem is to find an optimal compromise between (a) ob-
taining a good (expected) payoff a the current repetition t, which implies a high
value of αt; and (b) obtaining a good payoff at the next repetition t+1, assum-
ing that αt+1 will be set equal to one. To obtain a good payoff under (b), πt+1
must be high, which implies a low value of αt. The optimal αt is given by:
α∗ = arg max
α∈(0,1]
H (α)− 1
4
¡
JF
∗
t−1 −K (α)
¢
U∗2
1 +
¯¯
JF
∗
t−1 −K (α)
¯¯ × πt if JF∗t−1 −K (α) ≥ 0
1− πt otherwise
(21)
where JF
∗
t−1 , maxτ<t JFτ , H (α) = −12 (1− α)
2
U∗2, and K (α) = −12α2U∗2.
The corresponding expression for h = 2 is very messy and will not be reproduced
here. For h > 2, the expressions for α∗ are no longer practically amendable,
analytically and numerically.
The dependency of α∗ upon U∗, π, and JF∗t−1 in the cases h = 1 and h = 2 is
not monotonic, as one may recognize from the Figures 2 and 3. In these Figures,
we plot α∗ on the vertical axis against π (Figure 2) and JF∗ (Figure 3) on the
horizontal axis when h = 1 (circles) and h = 2 (squares). In Figure 2, JF
∗
is
given the value −7.5625, in Figure 3 we set π = 0.5. Due to computational
constraints, the indicated values of α∗ are somewhat coarse approximations of
the true values. They are restricted to multiples of 0.05, which explains the flat
sections and the occasional exact coincidence of the value of α∗ for h = 1 and
h = 2.
Two features of the results are worth emphasizing. First, with increasing
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JF
∗
, α∗ first decreases, and then increases until it takes the value α∗ = 1. As
long as the aspiration level JF
∗
is low (that is, strongly negative), L does not
have to choose α significantly smaller than α2 (defined in (15)) to make OCA
attractive and therefore to insure that π will increase over time. On the opposite,
when the private sector has very high expectations (when JF
∗
is close to 0), it
will be disappointed under OCA (that is, ρ will be a relatively large positive
number) independently of the value of α chosen by the government. It turns
out that under these conditions the government is better off by shortsightedly
maximizing its payoff under OCA than by trying to build up a reputation,
that is, to increase π by choosing a low α. Since F is assumed to have infinite
memory and to use the best payoff it obtained in the past as benchmark JF∗,
independently of how far in the past this payoff was realized, one cannot exclude
a lock-in where L plays α = 1 in any future repetition. This problem disappears
if one more realistically assumes that F has a finite memory, and/or revise
downwards the benchmark JF∗ if it is not attained or surpassed over several
repetitions. Second, contrary to what one might had expected, a government
that has a longer planning horizon (h = 2 instead of h = 1) will not necessarily
choose a lower value of α. The complexity of the trade-offs involved precludes
giving a clear-cut explanation of this last result.
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Figure 2: α∗ as a function of π, JF∗ = −7.5625, h = 1 and h = 2
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Figure 3: α∗ as a function of JF∗ , π = 0.5, h = 1 and h = 2
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4.3 Simulation results
In this Section, we present some illustrative simulation results when h = 1.
The graphs pertain to the instantaneous averages for t = 1, ..., 100 over 50
Monte Carlo runs. The fat lines correspond to the averages themselves, the
dotted ones to the averages +/- two standard deviations. The natural rate of
unemployment U∗ was set equal to 5.5, and θ equal to 1, as in Sargent (1999).
Thus, JL,N = −30.25 and JF,N = −15.125; JL,SF = JF,SF = −7.5625; and
JF∗· ∈ [−15.125, 0] .
The runs were initialized by conducting two repetitions assuming a constant
value for π, π−2 = π−1 = 0.5. The best payoff for F obtained over these two
repetitions was used as initial best past payoff, JF∗0 .
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the value of α chosen by L at each repetition.
This value is slowly decreasing from about 0.64 to an almost constant value of
about 0.587. It is worth noting that this value is considerably lower than the
value α2 = 0.88 that makes F indifferent between playing OCA and PAL, see
(15). Indeed, for α close to α2, F will frequently play PAL, generating a very
poor payoff for L. The latter is therefore motivated to significantly take into
account the former’s interest rather than making it indifferent between OCA
and PAL.
Figure 3 shows the frequency with which F plays OCA. This frequency
increases very rapidly, until stabilizing around a value only slightly lower than
1. That is, the private agents quickly learn to play almost always OCA. By
construction, the corresponding outcome lies (approximately) on the contract
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curve.
Figures 4 and 5 show the evolution over time of JL and JF . Both payoffs in-
crease over time, until practically stabilizing about some almost constant value.
The payoff improvement over time is significantly more important for F than
for L. From the onset, both players fare much better than under either N or
SF. The payoff volatility decreases over time for both players. Statistical tests
show that the volatility is similar for both players, contrary to what the graphs
may suggest due to the use of different scales. The volatility of all the vari-
ables presented in the Figures is fairly small, so that the mean appears a good
indicator of what might happen in a given historical situation.
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Figure 4: The time evolution of α
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Figure 5: The time evolution of the probability of playing OCA
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Figure 6: The time evolution of JLt
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Figure 7: The time evolution of JFt
5 Heterogenous private agents
In this section, we extend the model to the case of a large number of pri-
vate agents that independently decide to trust or to disregard the government’s
announcement, that is, to play OCA or PAL. This introduces heterogeneity
among the private agents, since they build up different individual histories and
different probabilities of playing OCA over time, even if they are initially iden-
tical in all respects. Moreover, and most importantly, when choosing y after
having announced ya, the government now simultaneously faces two types of
agents, the OCA− and the PAL− players, namely: those private agents that
believed the announcement and those that did not. This suggests looking for a
cheating strategy that, at each repetition, pareto-improves the situation of the
OCA− players and of L, while penalizing the PAL−players. Such a strategy is
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derived below, in the spirit of the approach followed in the single agent case.
Taking into consideration multiple private agents also implies making specific
assumptions about the information available on the πis and ρis. To suppose that
the different players know the individual probabilities πi would clearly be too
strong a conjecture. Making informal recourse to the law of large numbers,
we make here the somewhat milder assumption that the government and the
private agents share a common knowledge of the fraction π of players that will
play OCA at the current repetition. This information might, for example, be
provided by opinion polls and similar sources before the private agents actually
take their decisions. Likewise, using the fact that we are going to consider
only symmetric solutions where all PAL− respectively all OCA−players make
the same expectation, we assume that the payoffs previously obtained by both
player categories are common knowledge. Thus, it is natural the re-define the
variable ρ that drives the π-updating process, see (17) , (18) , (19), as:
ρt = JPALt − JOCAt , (22)
where JPALt is the payoff obtained by each PAL-player, and JOCAt is the payoff
obtained by each OCA-player in period t. That is, the updating of π is driven
by the relative success of the PAL vs. the OCA strategy in the current period,
rather than by the individual success histories. The definition of ρ can be
changed to, say, ρt = maxτ,θ≤t(JPALτ −JOCAθ ), without major qualitative impact
on the results.5
5Using the second definition opens the door to the lock-in effect previously mentioned for
29
The assumption of a known π, together with the other hypotheses previously
made on the information structure, imply that there is no incertitude at the
aggregate level within the single-shot game we are going to define. Accordingly,
L will not switch between using TL or TL,α depending on the realized outcome.
Nonetheless, the determinism at the aggregate level should not occult the fact
that the updating behavior of the individual private agents is stochastic. There
is full mixing in the sense that at each repetition any agent that previously
played PAL may play OCA, and vice versa.
5.1 The structure of the game
With the exception of above modifications, we use as basic ingredients the very
elements underlying the single agent case, or straightforward variants thereof.
There is a government L and a continuum of mass 1 of private agents F i. Agent’s
F i payoff is given by (2) , and L’s payoff by (5) . The sequence of play is:
1. The government makes a non-binding announcement ya,α.
2. After hearing ya,α, the agents F i play, independently of each other, either
OCA with probability πi or PAL with probability 1− πi.
3. The government implements an action yα.
The announcement ya,α and the action yα are determined simultaneously
as the solution of an OCα problem. As already mentioned, the main differ-
the single-agent case: convergence to the pareto-superior equilibrium will be impaired if a
sizable fraction of the private agents have previously experienced very high payoffs. This
lock-in effect cannot arise if one uses (22) .
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ence with the single agent case is that reaction of the private agents following
the announcement ya,α is (on the aggregate) deterministic, and that L always
implement yα.
Before defining the OCA and PAL options, and the OCα problem, notice
that, because: (a) the fraction π of private agents that play OCA (and thus, the
fraction 1−π of agents that play PAL) is known at the onset of any repetition;
and (b) all OCA−players choose the same value xa, and all PAL−players the
same value xSF , the average inflation is:
x = πxa + (1− π)xSF , π a known constant. (23)
As in the single agent case, we assume that the OCA choice xa is given by
the best response of an individual private agent to an announcement ya believed
to be true:
xa , TFi (ya) = ya. (24)
Since JFi depends only upon y and upon F i’s own expectation xi, any private
agent can compute xa without using any information on the actions of the others
and in particular, without knowing either π or x.
On the other hand, the value of xi under the PAL alternative is assumed to
be given by:
xSF , argmax
xi
JF
¡
xi, T
L
¡
x
¡
xSF
¢¢¢
. (25)
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with TL given by (6).That is, xSF is defined as the symmetric Stackelberg
leadership solution for private agents that:
1. take for granted that the government will act rationally in the sense of
replying to a given value of x with its best response y = TL (x);
2. rightly expect that π private agents will nonetheless believe the govern-
ment’s announcement and set xa = ya; and
3. recognize that their own individual choices have no influence on what is
feasible or desirable for the government (that is, recognize that they are
infinitesimally small). In other words, the PAL−players are perfectly
rational and well-informed, except possibly with regard to point (a).
The thus defined behavior of the PAL−players has an interesting implica-
tion. When π is high, the value of x is almost entirely determined by the choice
of the OCA−players, xa. The PAL−players have no interest in choosing a xSF
much different from xa. In other words, in a population where most agents trust
the government, the optimal behavior for the agents that do not is nonetheless
to act as if they did. Herding with the crowd is rational.
In a similar vein as in the single agent case, the government’s OCα problem
is to maximize the artificial pay-off function (26) simultaneously with respect
to ya,α and yα taking into account (23) , (24), and (25):
Jα , αJL (x, yα) + (1− α)JFi (ya,α, yα)− (1− π) (ya,α − yα)2 , (26)
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where α ∈ [0, 1]. The number π of private agents playing OCA does not ap-
pear in this definition because of symmetry. The term (1− π) (ya,α − yα)2 is
introduced to mitigate L’s tendency, when π is small, to use the unconditional
gullibility of the OCA-players (reflected in the fact that π is independent from
ya) to obtain a favorable value of x by making economically meaningless, ex-
treme announcements ya,α.
The function Jα defined by (26) shares, with some restriction, the ”con-
tract curve generating” properties of its counterpart (12). Consider the set
{(ya,α, xa, yα)} of optimal cheating solutions OCα generated by (26) for α ∈
[0, 1] . This set coincides with the set of all solutions that are pareto-efficient
in terms of the payoffs received by a fictitious player with objective function
L = JL (x, yα) − δ (1− π) (ya,α − yα)2 and by those F is that played OCA,
conditional on the PAL choice by the other players. However, for a given α,
pareto-improvements are possible if the PAL players change of strategy.
Most importantly, numerical evidence shows that:
There exists, for any π ∈ (0, 1), a non-empty interval [α1,α2] ⊂ [0, 1] such
that the solution where (a) π private agents play OCA; (b) (1− π) private
agents play PAL; and (c) L plays OCα, has the following properties: (i) for
L and the OCA-players, it (strictly) pareto-dominates the solution where all
private agents play PAL and L replies with its best response TL(x); and (ii) the
PAL−players fare no better (worst) than the OCA−players. Strict dominance
(inequalities) are given whenever α1 < α < α2.
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In other words, believing misleading governmental announcements may pareto-
improve the situation of the government and of the trustful agents, and insure
that the later are better off than the PAL−players. Since the aggregate out-
come is deterministic, L can always choose α ∈ [α1,α2] at the beginning of each
repetition in order for (i) and (ii) to hold.
The white zone in Figure (8) gives the set of (α,π) combinations for which
(i) and (ii) hold, for δ = 1 and for different values of θ. This set does not
depend upon U∗. The property (ii) is satisfied everywhere. The lower black zone
corresponds to points at which L’s payoff is lower than under the pure PAL
solution. If nobody plays OCA, cheating cannot improve L’s payoff. As the
number of OCA players increases, more and more benevolent (low α) cheating
suffices for such an improvement. Put somewhat crudely, for any value of α, it
pays for the government to have many private agents that trust it. The lower
black zone shifts to the left as θ increases. This reflects the fact that, when θ is
large, even a slight discrepancy between realized (y) and expected (x) inflation
suffices to insure an important increase in L’s payoff.
In the upper black zone, the OCA−players realize a lower payoff than the
PAL−players. One recognizes that hard cheating (high values of α) are less
detrimental to the OCA−players when they are few. The upper black zone,
too, shifts to the left as θ increases, for the reason already mentioned.
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Figure 8: Sets of (α,π) combinations for which (i) and (ii) hold
Contrary to the single agent case, actual cheating is not necessary for a
solution that is pareto-improving for the government and the private agents that
trust it. However, reducing the amount of cheating (as expressed by some norm
of (ya − ya,α)), decreases the payoff of the government and the OCA−players.
In particular,the introduction of the term (1− π) (ya,α − yα)2 in (26) leads to
worst results than might otherwise be obtained.
The dynamics linking successive repetitions are very much as in the single
agent case. The government maximizes at any repetition t, through its choice
of αt, αt+1, ..., αt+h, its expected cumulated payoff over a revolving horizon
t+ h, see (). However, L does not know the individual πis and ρis. We there-
fore assume that it bases its optimization calculus on predictions of the future
π values obtained with the help of an aggregate reinforcement rule. This rule,
obtained by using the mean values π and ρ in (18), is defined by:
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πOCAt+1 = πt −
ρt
1 + |ρt| ×



πt if ρt ≥ 0
1− πt if ρt < 0
, (27)
πPALt+1 = πt +
ρ∗t
1 + |ρ∗t |
×



1− πt if ρ∗t ≥ 0
πt if ρ∗t < 0
, (28)
πt+1 = πtπOCAt+1 + (1− πt)πPALt+1 , (29)
where ρt is given by (22) and ρ∗t = −ρt. Doing so, it makes a prevision error
on π+1. Stochastic simulations show that this error is small, and has almost no
impact on the time behavior of the solution.
5.2 Simulation results
Again, the equations defining the optimal solution and the dynamics are suffi-
ciently messy to justify the recourse to simulations. The value of the parameters
are as before: h = 1, θ = 1, and U∗ = 5.5. Thus, the payoffs under the pure
PAL−solution (π = 0) are JL,PAL = −30.25 and JF,N = −15.125. The results
presented are averages over a population of 1,000 private agents and 50 Monte
Carlo runs. The initial value of π is 0.1. That is, we consider a population
that initially almost completely distrusts the government. The time horizon is
of 20 periods. The simulation was conducted using a grid search algorithm for
the needed optimizations, thus coarsifying somewhat the results. No standard
deviations over the Monte Carlo runs are indicated, since their value is in the
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order of 10−16, except in the case of JL, where it takes the value of about 0.12
in the last 10 periods.
Figure 9 and 10 show that the optimal value of α very rapidly converges to a
constant value of about 0.39, while the fraction of OCA−players rapidly stabi-
lizes around 0.92%. Figure 11 illustrate the corresponding drastic improvement
in payoff for L. Within a few period, this payoff increases from -32.73 to -7.54,
clearly higher than the corresponding pure PAL or than the Ramsey value.
The evolution of the payoffs of the OCA− and PAL−players, finally, is
reproduced in Figure 12. Both converge, from above respectively from below,
to the very good value of -1.82 for the OCA− and -1.84 for the PAL−players.
These results prove remarkably robust with respect to variations in all pa-
rameters and can be considered generic, with only one exception. For very large
values of θ, the percentage of OCA players becomes small: in that case, the
government does not need that a large percentage of the population believes
the announcement in order to obtain high payoffs.
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Figure 9: The time evolution of α
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Figure 10: The time evolution of the fraction of private agents playing OCA
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Figure 11: The time evolution of JLt
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t (dashed).
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6 Conclusions
The results presented here bring some strong messages. Compared to the
Kydland-Prescott model, less sophisticated economic agents arrive to a bet-
ter result, comparable to the one that could be attained by using for example
complicated trigger strategies. Time inconsistency, understood as the discrep-
ancy between a policy declaration and the subsequent action, is no longer a
sufficient reason for rejecting governmental announcements. On the contrary,
lies are necessary or at least useful for pareto-improvement. With their help,
a government that is neither too myopic nor too stupid is able to better his
and the private agents’ payoffs — thus making it acceptable for the latter to be
repeatedly cheated upon.
This outcome is paradoxical only in appearance. The rationality of the
standard equilibria is based on the satisfaction of local first-order optimality
conditions. Players that stick to these equilibria are fundamentally blind, in
the sense that they are not considering the whole space of possibilities. Provid-
ing them for example with perfect foresight does not alleviate this fundamental
limitation. By contrast, in this paper, we freed the government and the pri-
vate agents from the tyranny of first-order conditions. Specifically, we gave the
government both the ability to search a large subset of the state space and the
wisdom to understand that (abstracting from the stable but unattractive Nash
equilibrium) only a mutually favorable solution could be sustained over time.
At the same time, we supplied the private sector with the freedom to assess
solutions not in terms of their classical optimality properties, but with regard
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to the pay-offs they insure. Under these conditions, it comes as no surprise that
the players could indeed coordinate on a superior outcome without recourse
to complex information processing. Notice, incidentally, that our approach re-
stores the government in its traditional role: to use a more global vision of the
economy than the one of the micro-economic agents in order to help overall
coordination and mitigate market failures.
As usual, numerous extensions of the model can be suggested. In particu-
lar, one might want to study the impact of uncertainty, both on the state of
the economy following a choice of actions by the players, and on the assumed
preferences and behavioral rules. Also, the consequences of other learning mech-
anisms than reinforcement should be thoroughly assessed. One extension, how-
ever, appears more fundamental, namely, to provide an explicit cognitive basis
for the behavior of the PAL−players in the heterogenous agents case. Indeed,
the results presented presuppose some kind of strong and rapid coordination
of the PAL−players: no satisfactory macroscopic outcome is possible if these
players act without very much taking into account what the others are doing.
In this paper, we assumed one of the strongest possible types of coordination,
namely, the timeless realization of a symmetric Stackelberg equilibrium. Most
interesting would be to find constructive mechanisms for information exchange
and coordination among private agents compatible with good macro-economic
results. The field of investigation appears vast, and constitutes the reserved
domain of future research.
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